Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist? : Attempting to reconcile heightened earthquake risk with sound fiscal policy by Oguro Kazumasa et al.
Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake
Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two
Coexist? : Attempting to reconcile heightened
earthquake risk with sound fiscal policy
著者 Oguro Kazumasa, Hiraizumi Nobuyuki, Owen
Michael, Guo Jicang
出版者 法政大学経済学部学会
journal or
publication title
経済志林
volume 85
number 1
page range 23-52
year 2017-08-22
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10114/13424
23
Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance 
Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist?
―Attempting to reconcile heightened earthquake
risk with sound fiscal policy―
Kazumasa Oguro
Nobuyuki Hiraizumi
Michael Owen
Jicang Guo
《Abstract》
From the standpoint of reconciling heightened earthquake risk with 
sound fiscal policy, this paper performs a simplified simulation analysis of 
obtainable risk reduction in proportion to reinsurance premiums to explore 
the potential for improving the claims-paying capacity of Japan’s earthquake 
insurance program by using reinsurance, which is currently considered the 
least expensive method for improving risk transfer/claims-paying capacity. 
We divided the roughly 5 trillion yen of risk that is currently retained by 
Japan’s earthquake insurance program into 21 layers, starting with four 
successive layers in the 200 billion yen to 1 trillion yen group and ending 
with four successive layers in the 4.2 to 5 trillion yen group. We then 
compared the price of risk (the reinsurance premiums necessary for 
reducing one unit of risk) for the different layers. Our analysis indicates 
that the four layers in the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen group could be reinsured 
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for the lowest price per unit risk. Hence, if these successive four layers 
were ceded, the reinsurance premiums to be paid in the base case would be 
42.5 billion yen (a 5.31 % reinsurance premium rate is applied for ceding 
800 billion yen of risk), thereby making a possible risk reduction in the 
order of 698.5 billion (99% Tail VaR).
Keywords: Government Special Account reform, earthquake insurance 
program, claims-paying capacity, reinsurance, price of risk, Tail VaR
JEL codes: H60, H61, H63
1. Introduction
From the standpoint of reconciling heightened earthquake risk with fiscal 
administration, this paper explores ways to increase the claims-paying 
capacity of Japan’s earthquake insurance program.1）
Originally established in 1966, the earthquake insurance system in Japan 
has been in place for over 40 years as a “public-private partnership,” and 
has received high marks both domestically and internationally. However, in 
view of recent concerns about another major earthquake, including one that 
could occur with an epicenter in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, excessive 
population concentration in Tokyo, the increased number of earthquake 
insurance policyholders and the attendant increase in PML (probability of 
maximum loss), and Special Account reform, the purpose and methods of 
the system now require a thorough re-examination.
At the same time, with developments in “financial engineering,” the two 
fields of traditional finance and insurance are effectively merging on a global 
1）This paper chiefly discusses the improvement in claims-paying capacity of earthquake 
insurance program from the aspect of risk financing. With regard to risk control-based 
discussion, refer to paper by Hiraizumi, Oguro, Mori and Nakakarumai (2006), etc.
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scale. Numerous examples include the securitization of earthquake risk, 
integrated management of insurance risk, and financial risk. Analyses, 
though not related to earthquake risk, are being performed by McNeil 
(1997) on the catastrophic fires in Denmark, and by Rootzen and Tajvidi 
(1997) on wind hazard insurance in Sweden. For some overseas public 
natural disaster insurance programs, development of these new financial 
technologies has made it possible to finance claims-paying capacity using 
new methods.
Under such circumstances, improving the claims-paying capacity of the 
earthquake insurance program has the potential to provide a solution to the 
conundrum of reconciling heightened earthquake risk with sound fiscal 
administration. All systems are constructed to achieve a principle or goal in 
a given environment. If changes have occurred in the environment, even 
though the principles and goals may remain the same, it’s natural that 
systemic reform may be required. 
Therefore, in this paper, we will clarify issues concerning the claims-
paying capacity of the existing earthquake insurance program, and, at the 
same time, perform a simplified simulation analysis to demonstrate the 
degree of risk reduction that might be achievable in proportion to 
reinsurance premiums. As an example we will use reinsurance, which is 
currently considered the least expensive measure for improving risk 
transfer/claims-paying capacity, to explore the possibility of improving the 
claims-paying capacity of the earthquake insurance program. 
Let us first summarize the results of our analysis as follows. We divided 
the roughly 5 trillion yen of risk retained by the current earthquake 
insurance program into 21 layers, starting with four successive layers in 
the 200 billion yen to 1 trillion yen group and ending with four successive 
layers in the 4.2 to 5 trillion yen group, and compared the price of risk 
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(reinsurance premiums necessary for reducing one unit of risk) for the 
different layers. Our analysis indicated that the four layers in the 1.4 to 2.2 
trillion yen group could be reinsured for the lowest price of risk. Hence, if 
these successive four layers were ceded, the reinsurance premiums to be 
paid under the basic case would be 42.5 billion yen (a 5.31 % reinsurance 
premium rate is applied for ceding 800 billion yen risk), thereby making 
possible risk reduction on the order of 698.5 billion yen risk reduction (99% 
Tail VaR).
This paper is composed of the following sections: Section 2 provides an 
overview of the claims-paying capacity of overseas public natural disaster 
insurance programs and discusses issues concerning the claims-paying 
capacity of Japan’s existing earthquake insurance program; Section 3 shows 
a simulation of how much risk can be reduced by paying what amount of 
reinsurance premiums, by using as an example, reinsurance, which is 
currently considered the least expensive measure for improving risk 
transfer/claims-paying capacity, and briefly looks at the results; and finally, 
Section 4 provides the conclusion and raises future issues.
2. Features of the claims-paying capacity of overseas public 
natural disaster insurance programs, and the issues faced by 
Japan’s earthquake insurance program 
2.1 Overview of Japan’s earthquake insurance program
We will first briefly outline Japan’s earthquake insurance program before 
describing features of the claims-paying capacity of some other overseas 
public natural disaster insurance programs. 
Japan’s earthquake insurance system is an integrated public-private 
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system under which the government shares insurance risk-bearing 
responsibility with private property & casualty (hereafter referred to as 
“P&C”) insurance companies through the mechanism of reinsurance. 
Unlike commonly available P&C insurance, the government reinsures 
private P&C insurance companies because of the special features of 
earthquake disasters—i.e., enormous damage may be incurred in the event 
of a massive earthquake; the losses caused by a single disaster may 
substantially exceed a private P&C insurance company’s ability to pay 
claims; and the fact that insurance income and outflows due to such claims 
need to be considered over an extremely long term in order to smooth out 
the risks, which makes it difficult for private insurance companies to 
operate stably inasmuch as they are focused on (relatively) shorter-term 
insurance income and outflows.
The earthquake reinsurance system is operated by private P&C 
insurance companies, the government, and the Japan Earthquake 
Reinsurance Company, Ltd. (hereafter referred to as “JER”). The latter 
company was established in accordance with the 1966 Earthquake 
Insurance Act as the only company in Japan authorized to handle 
reinsurance for earthquake damage to personal dwellings. JER accepts 
through reinsurance all earthquake insurance liabilities underwritten by 
private P&C insurance companies (Reinsurance Treaty A). JER then 
homogenizes and smooths the liabilities and receives secondary reinsurance 
coverage from private P&C insurance companies (Reinsurance Treaty B) 
and from the government (Reinsurance Treaty C) in accordance with their 
respective maximum limits, and bears the residual liabilities. (See Figure 1)
Furthermore, the system stipulates a ceiling for the insurance claim, 
total payments that should be borne jointly by the public and private 
sectors. This Insurance Claim Total Payment Limit is currently set at 5 
Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist?
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trillion yen (revised as of April 2005) per single earthquake.2）  This 
payment limit was determined based on an estimation of the total insurance 
claims payments that would be required in the event of a recurrence of an 
earthquake equivalent in scale to the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. 
Also, in order for the government and the private insurance companies to 
secure the payments of insurance claims, the share of burden and the 
burden amount of the Insurance Claim Total Payment Limit for the each of 
the public and private sector is stipulated. However, as it is not possible to 
accurately predict the damage caused by an earthquake, it is stipulated that 
in case the total amount of insurance claims to be paid due to a single 
earthquake exceeds the Insurance Claim Total Payment Limit (5 trillion 
yen), the insurance claims actually reimbursed by the public and private 
sector, respectively, can be reduced pro rata in accordance with their 
Figure 1: Structure of earthquake reinsurance 
Source: Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan 
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2）Although the Insurance Claim Total Payment for a single earthquake was stipulated at 5 
trillion yen until FY2008, it gradually rose from 5 trillion yen after FY2009 and is stipulated at 
7 trillion yen as of April 2015.
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respective share of that excess amount. 
In practice, payments of damage claims up to the first 75 billion yen of 
the 5 trillion yen shall be borne 100% by the insurance companies, and for 
amounts paid totaling between 75 billion yen up to 1,311.8 billion yen, 
insurance companies and the government shall each bear 50 % of the 
payment of insurance claims. Moreover, the government shall bear 95 % 
and insurance companies the remaining 5% of payments for the portion of 
total claims that exceeds 1,311.8 billion yen, up to 5 trillion yen (co-
insurance). Assuming a current total payment amount of 5 trillion yen, the 
private sector would bear 877.8 billion yen and the government would bear 
4 trillion 122.2 billion yen (See Figure 2). 
2.2 Features of the claims-paying capacity of overseas public natural 
disaster insurance programs
Herein, “claims-paying capacity” refers to the amount of funds that can 
be allocated to the payment of insurance claims, and, in the case of private 
P&C insurance companies, the capital base or shareholders’ equity in a 
broad sense (e.g. including liability reserve, provisions, marketable 
Figure 2: Insurance claim total payment limit and liability-sharing of by 
insurance companies and the Japanese government (as of April 2008)
Private insurance
companies
Government
0 yen 75 billion yen 131.18 billion yen
(Breakdown) Government: 4.1222 trillion,  private: 877.8 billion yen
50%
95%
5%
5 trillion yen
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securities, unrealized land profit, etc.). The public natural disaster 
insurance programs around the world have secured additional funds to pay 
insurance claims using methods such as reinsurance and issuance of 
catastrophe bonds for the portion exceeding this self-owned capital base. 
This is because the damage from a natural disaster is potentially so huge 
that it threatens sustainability of the company even if it may occur with low 
frequency, inasmuch as it may well exceed the liability reserve and self-
owned capital available to cover yearly expected losses. Although there are 
varied claims-paying sources apart from self-owned capital, typical methods 
include reinsurance, catastrophe bonds, borrowing facilities, and 
government guarantees. 
In other words, in Japan the claims-paying capacity of the earthquake 
insurance program is supported by private P&C insurance companies, JER, 
and the government’s Earthquake Reinsurance Special Account. But if we 
look at the claims-paying capacity of the overseas public natural disaster 
insurance programs, we see that they take advantage of a wider variety of 
methods, including coverage by reinsurance and/or secondary reinsurance, 
issuance of catastrophe bonds, allocation to private general insurance 
companies, additional collection of insurance premiums from policyholders, 
government guarantees, etc. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the claims-paying capacity of the public 
natural disaster insurance programs targeted at earthquake risks in the 
state of California, USA; New Zealand, Turkey and Taiwan, federal flood 
insurance, and the state of Florida’s hurricane (re)insurance.
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Table 1: Claims-paying capacity of overseas public natural disaster insurance 
programs3） 
Program name Total claims-paying 
capacity
Breakdown of claims-paying capacity
California Earthquake
Authority
10.2 billion US$
(a. through c.)
a. CE Capital
b. Reinsurance
c. Revenue Bonds Participating Insurer
 Assessments
Earthquake Commission 5.42 billion NZ$
(a. through d.)
a. EQC fund
b. EQC fund + reinsurance
c. Reinsurance
d. EQC fund
e. Government guarantee
Turkish Catastrophe
Insurance Pool
1 billion US$ 
(a. through f.)
a. TCIP’s surplus fund
b. World Bank
c. Reinsurance 1st layer
d. Reinsurance 2nd layer
e. Reinsurance 3rd layer
f. World Bank
g. Government
Taiwan Residential
Earthquake Insurance Pool
60 billion NT$
(a. through e.)
a. Private P&C insurance companies
b. TREIP fund
c. Reinsurance, catastrophe bonds
d. TREIP fund
e. Government
National Flood Insurance
Program
30.425 billion US$ 
(b.)
a. NFIP Surplus (Turned into deficit since
Hurricane Katrina.)
b. Has the authority to borrow from the
Department of Treasury (expanded to
30.425 18.5 billion US$ in January 6, 2013. 
Citizens Property
Insurance+ Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
17.25 billion US$
 (b.)＋17 billionUS$
 (c.)
a. Citizens’ Surplus
b. Reinsurance by FHCF＋Industry
Co-Payments
c. Pre-Event Bonds + Industry Co-Payments
d. Post-Event Bonding + Industry
Co-Payments
e. Remaining Surplus of Citizens
Japan’s earthquake
insurance program 
7 trillion JPY a. Private P&C insurance companies
b. Government (Earthquake Reinsurance 
Special Account) + private P&C insurance 
companies
Source: Prepared by authors of this paper. 
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3）Regarding the details of the total claims-paying capacity, see Phillips Lewis (2006), 
Earthquake Commission (2006), Gurenko Eugene N (2005); Guy Carpenter (2006a), 
American Institutes for Research et al. (2005); and Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 
(2007). 
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We can see from this table that the claims-paying capacity of the 
overseas public disaster insurance programs are characterized by their 
efforts to transfer disaster risk as much as possible to other parties rather 
than retaining it all within their countries. Although the methods of risk 
transfer vary, by and large, after their liability reserve has been fully paid 
out, the programs have access to “own capital” for the lower layer, 
reinsurance and catastrophe bonds for the middle layer, and government 
(public funds) for the upper layer. In other words, they have designed role-
sharing systems by which they manage high frequency and small damage 
risk with private capital bases, low frequency but bigger damage risk with 
reinsurance, and exceptionally rare but major damage risk with 
government commitments. This design helps them respond to relatively 
large-scale disaster while at the same time controlling reinsurance 
premiums. 
The features of the claims-paying capacity of overseas public natural 
disaster insurance programs can be summarized by the following three 
points: 
a.  Reinsurance is being used with the exception of the National Flood 
Insurance Program and Japan’s earthquake insurance program.
b.  Reinsurance is being used for the middle layer (shaded parts in the table). 
c.  Governments manage the upper layer and serve as the insurer of last 
resort. 
2.3 The challenge of the claims-paying capacity of the Earthquake 
Reinsurance Special Account
Japan’s earthquake insurance system (or the Earthquake Reinsurance 
Special Account) currently retains all the risk within the system (or within 
the Special Account). However in view of the design of overseas public 
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natural disaster insurance programs, there seems to be ample room to take 
advantage of transfer mechanisms such as reinsurance and improving 
claims-paying capacity. There are three keys to addressing this issue.
(1) The current system retains all risk
Insurance is a mechanism under which a policyholder, who wishes to 
reduce economic uncertainty, transfers risk to an insurer, while the insurer 
distributes the risk by way of risk pooling, premium rate setting and 
product design by leveraging the law of large numbers (end result will be 
close to the average) and central limit theorem (end result will be close to 
the normal distribution). In other words, it is a mechanism under which the 
risk is transferred from one economic entity to another entity (e.g. from 
policyholder to insurer to reinsurer) who can more efficiently manage and 
process the risk. The primary yardstick for when to retain or transfer (or 
insure) risk is as follows: “retain reasonably predictable risk and transfer 
potentially large and destructive risk.” Natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, which occur with low frequency but cause major damage, are 
a prime candidate for risk transfer. 
By contrast, under Japan’s current earthquake insurance system, all 
earthquake risks, including even such risks that might as well be 
transferred, are retained and not transferred outside of Japan. It is true 
that, unlike commercial enterprises, there is no way that the Earthquake 
Reinsurance Special Account will default on its obligations, because if it 
were in danger of defaulting, there would be transfers from the general 
account. However, as a special account, it should maintain its financial 
independence to the full extent that is feasible. It goes without saying it 
would be desirable that it did not rely on transfers from the general account 
at all.
The system advocates balancing revenue and expenditure over a 500-
Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist?
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year span. It assumes as a general principle that even if within a certain 
period it may temporarily be obliged to rely on transfers from the general 
account, it should be able to repay that borrowing at some later stage, and 
thereby maintain its self-containment (financial independence) as a Special 
Account.
However, setting aside theoretical discussion, a period of 500 years is 
hardly a practical time frame to use for realistic planning purposes. If 1966, 
the launch year of the earthquake insurance system, is designated as the 
first year, 500 years from that time would be 2466. If so, it is highly likely 
that if a large-scale earthquake disaster occurs, the self-containment of the 
Earthquake Reinsurance Special Account would be damaged over a 
considerably long period of time as long as borrowing from the general 
account remains on the balance sheet.
(2) Burden on non-policyholders is not taken into account
Under the current methods of retaining all earthquake risk within the 
system, when the payment of insurance claims to earthquake insurance 
policyholders exceeds approx. 2 trillion yen,4） the reserve that has been 
accumulated in the past 40 years since the launch of the system in the 
Special Account runs out, and necessitates transfer from the general 
account. Incidentally, an earthquake disaster exceeding this level occurs 
once in 88 years according to the risk model used for simulation in Section 
3. Furthermore, in consideration of the current approximately 50 billion 
yen annual provision for liability reserve (the amount roughly equal to the 
total revenue of the government’s Earthquake Reinsurance Special Account 
4）It equals the sum of the balance of the contingency reserve of the private general insurance 
companies (806.1 billion yen) and the balance of the liability reserve of the Earthquake 
Reinsurance Special Account (1012.3 billion yen, as of March 31, 2006). To be more precise, 
it is approx. 1.8 trillion yen. 
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from insurance premium), it would require approximately 60 years for the 
Special Account to increase its liability reserve to the level of 4 trillion yen, 
even if insurance claims payments after a large-scale earthquake are made. 
Most importantly, however, transfer from the general account would mean 
forcing non-policyholders of earthquake insurance to also bear a burden, 
even though they would have received no benefit.
It is fundamental that the earthquake insurance program is maintained 
and operated under the Special Account in order to clarify the relation 
between benefits and burdens, and revenue and expenditure of the 
operation by separating accounting for insurance policyholders from other 
accounts. It is extremely important that under the operation of this system, 
the policyholders who pay insurance premiums in exchange for risk 
transfer are differentiated from non-policyholders, and therefore creation of 
a special account is considered essential. Therefore, a transfer from the 
general account intended to pay out insurance claims in excess of the 
liability reserve must be avoided at the outset, through system design, 
product design, premium setting, and other means.
As a matter of logic, if one places a burden on non-policyholders, they 
will naturally demand a benefit, and the earthquake insurance will no longer 
be insurance for the policyholders but will become a mechanism for 
revenue transfer that does not take into account the beneficiary’s 
qualification. Therefore, a “risk transfer” that helps reduce the burden on 
non-policyholders as much as possible is necessary to maintain the integrity 
of the system. If the insurance as a system were to fail and turn into a 
revenue transfer mechanism, it would undermine the non-policyholders’ 
proper attitude toward risk. Furthermore, it could also have a negative 
impact on the overall countermeasures against earthquake disaster, 
including risk reduction initiatives, irrespective of the earthquake 
Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist?
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insurance system. For instance, following the 1999 Izmit Earthquake, with 
an aim to have another look at all the systems with earthquake risk, the 
government of Turkey launched a new earthquake insurance system 
(TCIP) that offers compulsory earthquake insurance in collaboration with 
the World Bank. However, since TCIP provided generous compensation for 
the disaster victims of the Afyon Earthquake in 2002 and the Bingöl 
Earthquake in 2003 without drawing a line between policyholders of the 
compulsory insurance and non-policyholders, the non-policyholders’ proper 
attitude toward risk was lost thus, creating a classic case of moral hazard.
If a large-scale earthquake exceeding the liability reserve of the 
Earthquake Reinsurance Special Account should occur in Japan, the 
insurance premium burden on policyholders is likely to increase. However, 
if this additional burden cannot be covered solely by increasing the 
insurance premium burden, the government will be forced to transfer funds 
from the general account by way of issuing government bonds. The 
common explanation is that unlike geological distribution (reinsurance) of 
earthquake risk adopted by other countries, Japan’s system is intended to 
distribute earthquake risk by smoothing over time. However, the issuance 
of government bonds could, in turn, increase the burden on non-
policyholders as well. Transfer from the general account should be 
considered solely as a last-resort measure to maintain the viability of the 
insurance system. Would it be possible to forthrightly justify transfer from 
the general account by maintaining that it is intended to distribute risk in 
terms of time? Probably not. It is true that the net premium rates of the 
earthquake insurance program are calculated based on the damage data of 
about 400 earthquake events in the past 500 years or so. However, that 
does not necessarily mean that the risk is sufficiently distributed in reality. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the transfer from the general account 
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can, depending on the time of maturity of the corresponding government 
bonds, invite the moral hazard issue of postponing the burden to the next 
generation and beyond. If the risk is more effectively distributed time-wise, 
and the time of maturity is set over a long period of time, the burden may 
be postponed further, and the burden on the current generation will be 
reduced. It is quite natural that the generations still working at the time of 
the earthquake event are tempted to ease the burden on their own 
generations by postponing it as much as possible over a longer period of 
time. However, the later generations will have to face earthquake risk 
during their own lives. In short, risk distribution in terms of time, based on 
possible transfer from the general account, has the additional issue of 
postponing the burden to the next generation and beyond. 
(3)  A trade-off relation between the earthquake insurance portfolio risk 
and risk transfer cost
Although many have pointed out the high cost of reinsurance, which is 
the most prevailing and convenient transfer method, premiums have 
actually been settling down to a theoretically reasonable level through the 
development and spread of alternative risk transfer methods benefiting 
from advances in various financial technologies. The reinsurance premium 
rate is the sum of yearly expected losses (or net insurance premium rate), 
sales and general administrative expenses, capital cost and profit, or the 
sum of yearly expected loss and risk load. And the risk load is the sum of 
sales and general administrative expenses, capital cost and profit, or the 
value obtained by multiplying the standard deviation of the yearly expected 
loss (or net insurance premium rate) by a constant that varies by 
reinsurance company.5） 
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This reinsurance premium is, so to speak, a “theoretical” value, and it 
can differ from actual reinsurance premiums to a great extent, which vary 
depending on supply and demand in particular, due to the insurance 
underwriting cycle. As an example, the reinsurance underwriting cycle for 
natural disasters in the US is shown in Figure 3. The “insurance 
underwriting cycle” in general refers to the contraction and expansion 
cycle of the reinsurance market that usually involves the following stages: 
1) the reinsurance companies’ capital is impaired due to huge insurance 
payouts for damages from a large-scale natural disaster, or, the reinsurance 
companies exit the market, and cost of (scarce) capital increases, which 
means that the reinsurance premium rate soars (hardening of the market); 
2) attracted to the appreciating reinsurance premium rate, new capital 
flows into the reinsurance industry, the capital becomes abundant partly 
because of the new entrants, and the reinsurance premium rate begins to 
settle; but then 3) capital inflows continue to an excessive level, and 
reinsurance premium dumping begins (softening of the market), thereby 
significantly impairing capital in the event of the occurrence of a disaster, 
thereby obliging reinsurance companies to undertake reinsurance at 
premium rates that force some of them to exit the market.
Recently, after Hurricane Katrina hit the southern US in August 2005, 
resulting in the largest-ever insurance claim payment of 38 billion dollars, 
the insurance underwriting cycle that makes the reinsurance premium rate 
volatile had a major negative impact on the reinsurance premium rates in 
the US, boosting them to 76.2 % for contracts being renewed in the 4th 
quarter of 2005.6） As a result, the issuance of catastrophe bonds reached 
4.69 billion dollars (8.48 billion dollars on the outstanding issue basis, which 
6）See Guy Carpenter (2006b). 
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was over twice as much as the previous record amount of 1.99 billion 
dollars in 2005.7） The transfer methods (ART or alternative risk transfer) 
represented by catastrophe bonds other than reinsurance programs have 
become diverse with time. At the same time, supported by a broadened 
investor base such as hedge funds, CAT (catastrophe) investment funds, 
and others, these methods have also come to complement reinsurance if not 
replace it.  It is expected that further expansion of the market will 
complement the currently about 124 billion dollar-scale reinsurance market 
for natural disasters (2006 data) and contribute to its stabilization.8）
As discussed above, as ART including catastrophe bonds define the upper 
limit of reinsurance premium rate, it has become increasingly difficult for 
reinsurance companies to present exorbitant premium rates that deviate 
from prevailing market rates.
Figure 3: Undertaking cycle of reinsurance for natural disasters in the US
（出典）：Guy Carpenter & Company,Inc.
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8）Rainer Helfenstein and Dr. Thomas Holzheu (2006) —“Securitization—New Opportunities 
for Insurers and Investors,” sigma No. 7/2006, Swiss Reinsurance Company.
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3. Analysis of a specific proposal for improving claims-paying 
capacity
Based on the discussion so far, in this Section, we would like to propose 
specific measures for improving the claims-paying capacity of Japan’s 
earthquake insurance program with the use of reinsurance.9） 
To this end, on the basis of the earthquake insurance ownership status as 
of the end of FY2005 (Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan), 
etc., we will conduct a simulation and verify the possibility of improvement 
with the purpose of clarifying which layer should be ceded in order to 
achieve maximum risk reduction with minimum reinsurance premiums. 
We set the reinsurance premiums as a theoretical value by abstracting 
the demand-supply factors of each year and adopt the average value 
obtained by equation (1) and (2) below.
(1) Pure premium rate + risk load 
The risk load consists of one of the following: (a) cost + profit + capital 
cost, (b) cost + profit, or (c) standard deviation of the pure premium rate × 
α (a constant ratio decided on by each reinsurance company, which varies 
depending on the claims paid, ROE, stock price, etc. of the preceding year).
(2) Investment Equivalent Reinsurance Pricing
This is a practical reinsurance underwriting standard for reinsurance 
companies advocated by Kreps (1998) (1999). Although this is a simplified 
version of several models, it can be intuitively expressed as “(capital × cost 
of capital + expected loss in claims + SG&A cost – return on portfolio 
investment) ÷ capital.” It can also be explained as follows. If a reinsurance 
9）We enlisted the cooperation of Guy Carpenter, the world’s largest reinsurance broker (arranging 
optimal reinsurance capacity for their clients, general insurance companies) in the world’s largest 
catastrophe (CAT) field as this simulation required detailed earthquake data, etc.
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company obtains capital from shareholders at the cost of capital (ROE), 
underwrites reinsurance (equivalent to the amount of capital) secured by 
capital, and invests the amount in risk-free bonds, the average cost will 
roughly be “capital × cost of capital + expected loss + SG&A cost – return 
on risk-free bond investment.” The ratio of the average cost to its own 
capital is equal to the average loss rate in case the relevant reinsurance 
company does not demand reinsurance premiums. In short, if this 
reinsurance company underwrites reinsurance risk-neutrally and with zero 
profit, it would need to demand this reinsurance premium rate. That is to 
say that this reinsurance premium rate corresponds to the break-even point 
for such a hypothetical reinsurance company. 
As a base case, “advisory pure premium rate + standard deviation of 
advisory pure premium rate×α” that is most commonly used in the reinsurance 
industry is adopted for equation (1) by choosing α = 33%. As for equation 
(2), we chose cost of capital (ROE) = 10% and SG&A cost rate = 13%. 
With regard to a measure of risk reduction, 99% tail VaR was used as the 
indicator to find out how much risk has been reduced compared with the 
case where all earthquake risk is retained (no cession). Incidentally, 99 % 
tail VaR is the average value of loss likely to occur with a frequency of once 
in one hundred years, and it is set at approximately 2.5 trillion yen under 
present circumstances (all risk retained, no cession).
Other conditions of the simulation are as described below: 
a.  The upper limit of reinsurance premium is 50 billion yen, which is 
equivalent to the reinsurance premium income of the Special Account 
(return from investing policy reserve is put in a lockbox.) 
b.  The ceiling on ceded insurance is 1 trillion yen. 
c.  There are a total of 24 layers starting from 200 billion yen (set at this level 
for purposes of  simplification, although technically it should be set at 75 
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billion yen, at which point payment from the Special Account starts) up 
to 5 trillion yen at a 200 billion yen intervals.
d.  Although there are 10,626 combinations in arbitrarily choosing 4 layers 
from 24 layers, for simplification, we conduct simulation on 21 patterns 
under which four successive layers are ceded.
Based on the above settings, we conducted 500,000 consecutive 
simulations on 21 patterns under which 4 layers out of the 24 layers are 
ceded at the same time, using the Monte Carlo method that takes into 
account the event probability of each earthquake, etc. The results are 
shown in Figure 4. (See Appendix for an outline of the simulation model.)
The left vertical axis indicates the expected loss including reinsurance 
premiums; the right vertical axis indicates reinsurance premiums; and the 
horizontal axis indicates 99 % tail VaR as the risk indicator, showing the 
amount of loss incurred with a frequency of once in one hundred years. 
This figure presents two different plotted points: those showing the 
relationship between the expected loss and risk, and the others showing the 
relationship between the reinsurance premiums and risk. The former (blue 
plotted points) represents the expected loss and the risk (99% tail VaR) that 
the Special Account would incur in the case of ceding 800 billion yen risk 
(ceding four adjoining layers of 200 billion yen in succession). For instance, 
prior to cession, the Special Account retained slightly below 60 billion yen 
expected loss and 2 trillion 500 billion yen risk. If this risk is ceded, one 
blue plotted point of the former moves to other blue point clockwise and 
one red plotted point  of  the latter  moves to other red point 
counterclockwise. It is clear from this figure that it is possible to reduce 
the risk to about 1 trillion 700 billion yen at a maximum, in which case, 
however, the expected loss will increase due to payment of reinsurance 
premiums.
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Next, the latter red plotted points in Figure 4 represent the relationship 
between the reinsurance premiums paid out by the Special Account and the 
subsequent risk in the case of ceding 800 billion yen risk (ceding four 
adjoining layers of 200 billion yen in succession). What is significant here is 
the relationship between the upper limit of reinsurance premiums and the 
Earthquake Reinsurance Special Account’s reserve. With approximately 50 
billion yen annual reinsurance premiums income, the Special Account is 
able to pay out only for the area below the horizontal bold line. In this case, 
all of the latter red plotted points are located in this area. On the other 
hand, the Special Account’s own capital is about 1 trillion yen, which is 
shown as the vertical bold line. The closer the risk is to this line, the 
better. Now, which layer should best be ceded can be judged by the latter 
plotted points that represent the relationship between the reinsurance 
premiums and risk. The point prior to the cession is plotted on the vertical 
line, indicating zero reinsurance premiums and 2 trillion 500 billion yen 
Figure 4: Reinsurance premiums of the Earthquake Reinsurance Special
　　　　 Account vs 99% tail VaR
Risk (99% TVaR)
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Fiscal Reform and Improved Earthquake Insurance Claims-paying Capacity: Can the Two Coexist?
44
risk. If straight lines are drawn to connect this point with the respective 
latter plotted points that show the relationship between reinsurance 
premiums and risk, the vertical width shows the reinsurance premiums, 
and the horizontal width shows the price of risk reduction. If we call 
reinsurance premiums necessary for reducing one unit of risk “price of risk 
reduction,” it equals the slope of these straight lines. This is usually called 
“price of risk.” Let us now move on to study the criteria for judging which 
layers to be ceded by leveraging this price of risk.
Ceded layer 0.2～1 0.4～1.2 0.6～1.4 0.8～1.6 1～1.8 1.2～2 1.4～2.2 1.6～2.4 1.8～2.6 2～2.8 2.2～3
Base case 13.60% 11.14% 9.13% 7.68% 6.84% 6.33% 6.08% 6.10% 6.39% 7.05% 7.90%
Sensitivity 
analysis 1
14.74% 12.23% 10.20% 8.77% 7.92% 7.39% 7.17% 7.25% 7.68% 8.53% 9.64%
Sensitivity 
analysis 2
13.92% 11.36% 9.32% 7.86% 6.99% 6.45% 6.20% 6.21% 6.51% 7.43% 8.02%
Sensitivity 
analysis 3
13.80% 11.27% 9.24% 7.79% 6.96% 6.42% 6.18% 6.19% 6.50% 7.15% 8.02%
Ceded layer 2.4～3.2 2.6～3.4 2.8～3.6 3～3.8 3.2～4 3.4～4.2 3.6～4.4 3.8～4.6 4～4.8 4.2～5
Base case 8.81% 12.44% 10.98% 12.23% 13.65% 15.29% 17.22% 19.41% 22.00% 24.89%
Sensitivity 
analysis 1
10.87% 12.25% 13.76% 15.45% 17.40% 19.66% 22.36% 25.48% 29.20% 33.46%
Sensitivity 
analysis 2
8.98% 10.02% 11.17% 12.44% 13.85% 15.52% 17.49% 19.73% 22.28% 25.22%
Sensitivity 
analysis 3
8.98% 10.05% 11.20% 12.49% 13.90% 15.59% 17.56% 19.81% 22.47% 25.45%
 Source: Prepared by authors of this paper. 
Figure 5: Price of risk estimation results
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The price of risk can be obtained by dividing reinsurance premiums by 
the price of risk reduction. The basic case in Figure 5 shows the price of 
risk calculated by four successive layers. A comparison of the 21 sets of 
layers, starting with the four successive layers in the 0.2 to 1 trillion yen 
group and ending with the four successive layers in the 4.2 to 5 trillion yen 
group, shows that the four layers in the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen group 
achieved the lowest price of risk. These four layers in the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion 
yen group are positioned in the middle of the layers ranging from 0.2 to 5 
trillion yen. This result coincides with the fact that the overseas public 
natural disaster insurance programs utilize reinsurance for the middle 
layers, as shown in Table 1. 
The following is our intuitive reason why this layer achieves the lowest 
price of risk. First, although the earthquake damage is small in the lower 
layers from 0.2 to 1.0 trillion yen, etc., the price of risk goes up because of 
the higher event probability. On the other hand, although the earthquake 
event probability of upper layers from 4.2 to 5.0 trillion yen, etc. is lower, 
the price of risk is higher due to greater damage. This leads us to conclude 
that the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen layer, positioned in the middle of the layers, 
can be insured for the lowest price of risk. If these successive four layers 
were ceded, the reinsurance premiums to be paid would be 42.5 billion yen, 
and considering the 5.31% reinsurance premium rate for ceding 800 billion 
yen risk, a 698.5 billion yen risk reduction (99 % Tail VaR) would be 
achieved. 
Figure 5 also shows sensitivity analyses of the base case. More 
specifically, α of “standard deviation × α” of equation (1) and ROE and 
cost rate of equation (2) were changed by +2% to come up with estimation 
results shown as sensitivity analysis 1 through 3. It is also clear from these 
estimation results that the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen layer achieves the lowest 
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price of risk.
For instance, in ceding 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen layer, if the reinsurance 
premiums is covered by increase in insurance premiums and not by 
reinsurance premium income of the Special Account (approximately 50 
billion yen), the new insurance is estimated to be approximately 1.6 times 
more expensive than the current insurance premiums (89 billion yen ÷ 
55.6 billion yen).10） This is because while the values obtained by dividing 
the expected loss (including reinsurance premiums), as shown in Figure 5, 
by the total insurance payment mostly equal to the advisory pure premium 
rate, if no layers are ceded, the expected loss is estimated to be 55.6 billion 
yen; if the four layers of 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen are ceded, the expected loss 
is estimated to be 89 billion yen. 
4. Summary and future agenda
As discussed above, from the standpoint of reconciling heightened 
earthquake risk with sound fiscal administration, we performed a simplified 
simulation analysis of risk reduction in proportion to reinsurance premiums 
to explore the potential for improving the claims-paying capacity of Japan’s 
earthquake insurance program by using reinsurance, which is currently 
considered the least expensive method for improving risk transfer/claims-
paying capacity.
We divided roughly 5 trillion yen risk retained by the current earthquake 
10）The basis for 1.6 times: the risk premiums contained in the current insurance premiums 
calculated by the Non-Life Insurance Rating Organization of Japan based on the “advisory 
pure premium rate (expected loss, etc.) + SG&A cost,” under the principle of “no profit, no 
loss,” is smaller than the risk load, etc. that we used in calculating reinsurance premiums in 
this paper If a similar level of risk premiums is added to the current insurance premiums, the 
“value of 1.6 times more expensive” could be much cheaper.
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insurance program into 21 sets of layers, starting with four successive 
layers in the 200 billion yen to 1 trillion yen group and ending with four 
successive layers in the 4.2 to 5 trillion yen group, and compared the price 
of risk (reinsurance premiums necessary for reducing one unit of risk) for 
the different layers. 
Our analysis indicated that the four layers in the 1.4 to 2.2 trillion yen 
group could be reinsured for the lowest price per unit risk. Hence, if these 
successive four layers were ceded, the reinsurance premiums to be paid 
under the basic case would be 42.5 billion yen (a 5.31% reinsurance premium 
rate is applied for ceding 800 billion yen risk), thereby making possible risk 
reduction on the order of 698.5 billion (99 % Tail VaR). Hence, it is clear 
that there is a good chance that the claims-paying capacity of the current 
earthquake insurance program can be improved. 
Secondly, let us refer to several future policy agenda items that are 
suggested by this analysis, from the standpoint of improving the claims-
paying capacity of the earthquake insurance program.
The first policy agenda item would be to refine the simulation 
methodology presented in this paper. We consider it necessary to refine the 
following aspects of our simulation that we were unable to cope with due to 
limited resources and time constraints: 
a.  Upper limit of reinsurance premiums: This was set at 50 billion yen for 
our simulation. We should perform another simulation by changing the 
values, ranging from 10 billion yen to 40 billion yen. .
b.  Cession of non-successive layers: We ceded four successive layers under 
our simulation. We should seek four layers that would realize maximum 
risk reduction at a minimum reinsurance premium.
c.  Estimation of an optimal total ceded amount: Although we set it at 1 
trillion yen under our simulation based on interviews with scholars, up to 
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3 trillion yen is also considered theoretically possible depending on the 
price.
d.  Adoption of reinsurance premiums by taking into account supply and 
demand factors: We abstracted the demand-supply factors for 
reinsurance under our simulation. What would happen if we modeled 
price fluctuation and took demand-supply factors into account? 
The second policy agenda item would be to undertake an analysis to 
compare against other risk transfer methods. Due to limitations regarding 
models and analysis, in this paper we discussed risk reduction possibilities 
focusing entirely on cession. However, comparative analysis with other risk 
transfer methods such as catastrophe bonds would be highly desirable. We 
would like to undertake comparative analyses in the future.
The third agenda item would be the efficiency indicator used to measure 
the selection of an optimal cession layer. In this paper, we used “price of 
risk,” obtained by dividing reinsurance premiums by the price of risk 
reduction, as the indicator for our analysis. However, it is important to use 
a variety of indicators to the extent possible, to carry forward the analysis. 
We would like to include this in our future agenda. 
As well, currently a legal framework that allows cession is not in place. 
In order to adopt cession methods, amendment of the law will be required. 
Needless to say, if we decide to study cession in a factual and rigorous 
manner, public understanding must be gained concerning the reduction of 
risk (99% tail VaR) associated with cession and its associated cost burden 
(reinsurance premiums). 
At any rate, following its establishment in 1966, the earthquake 
insurance system in Japan has continued for over 40 years as a “public-
private partnership,” and has received high marks both within Japan and 
internationally. However, in view of recent concerns about another a major 
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earthquake, including one that could occur with an epicenter in the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area, excessive population concentration in Tokyo, the 
increased number of earthquake insurance policyholders and the attendant 
increase in PML (probability of maximum loss), and Special Account 
reform, the purpose and methods of the system now require a thorough re-
examination.
Amid calls for reconciling heightened earthquake risk with sound fiscal 
policy, we hope that this paper will serve as a starting point for designing a 
more efficient earthquake insurance system. 
Appendix: Outline of the Simulation Model
In building the simulation model described in this paper, we estimated 
the expected loss (including reinsurance premiums), reinsurance 
premiums, and risk (99% TVaR) using the following steps: 
(1)  Obtain an event curve of earthquakes in Japan. An event curve is a 
curved line that expresses the risk of the target of the analysis, with the 
horizontal axis indicating the expected loss and the vertical axis 
indicating the annual exceedance probability. For this model, we used 
an event curve that mostly matched the one for which the government 
projects a 5 trillion yen earthquake insurance payment in anticipation of 
the recurrence of an earthquake comparable to the Great Kanto 
Earthquake in 1923. More specifically, we holistically took into account 
and used the event curves estimated by several specialized 
organizations such as OYO RMS Corporation.
(2)  Next, set parameters that are used as premises for estimating 
reinsurance premiums such as 1) α of the risk load (standard deviation 
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of advisory pure premium rate×α), which is commonly used by reinsurance 
industry, and 2) ROE and cost rate of Kreps (1999) Investment 
Equivalent Reinsurance Pricing.
(3)  Choose the layers to be ceded. Then, based on the event curve described 
in (1) above and in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation method, 
estimate the advisory pure premium rate for the layers to be ceded and 
Kreps (1999) Investment Equivalent Reinsurance Pricing so as to 
estimate the reinsurance premiums. 
(4)  Finally, estimate the expected loss and the risk retained (99% TVaR) by 
the remaining layers of the earthquake insurance (excluding the layers 
ceded) in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation method.
As for the supporting theories of (3) and (4), see Kreps (2009) “Theory and 
Practice of Timeline Simulation” Variance Casualty Actuarial Society – 
Arlington, V irginia 2009: Spring, Volume 03, Issue 01, pp. 62-95. 
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